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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT/APPELLANT DID JOIN IN THE MOTION FOR 
CONTINUANCE WITH CO-DEFENDANT. 
Plaintiff/Appellee claims that Defendant Carter failed 
to join in Ellis' Motion For Continuance. Although, the 
record does not specifically state that Defendant Carter 
joined in the Motion for Continuance, his counsel had in 
fact informed the court that Defendant Carter was joining in 
said motion. The Judge obviously understood this, as is 
reflected by the record when he asked Defendant Carter's 
counsel if he had anything to add. (Supp. Tr. Page 4 line 
5-6) . 
The Plaintiff/Appellee states that the only indication 
that the Defendant/Appellant intended to enter into the 
Motion For Continuance was his ambiguous statement, "I don't 
have anything to add, your honor". This was not an 
ambiguous statement. It clearly states that Defendant 
Carter's counsel did not have any further argument to add to 
Defendant Ellis' qounsel's arguments in support of the 
1 
Motion to continue the trial. Also, by asking Defendant 
Carter's counsel if he had anything to add, the Judge 
clearly expressed his intention to include Defendant Carter 
in the Motion. 
If Defendant/Appellant had no interest in entering into 
the motion for continuance he would have clearly stated for 
the record that Defendant/Appellant was not interested in a 
continuance and wished to proceed with trial. However, this 
was not the case. In fact, prior to the commencement of the 
trial, the State pointed out to the Court that Defendant 
Ellis' testimony was important to Defendant Carter's 
defense. If Defendant Ellis were to receive a continuance 
and Defendant Carter were to proceed to trial, Defendant 
Carter, of course would not have the benefit of Defendant 
Ellis' testimony. Defendant Carter's counsel informed the 
Court that he believed it would be prejudicial to Defendant 
Carter if Defendant Ellis were not tried at the same time. 
(Hearing Tr. Page 4, line 3-9) It simply would not make 
sense for Defendant Carter to not join in the Motion To 
2 
Continue and face the possibility of a trial without 
Defendant Ellis. 
The State insisted on the Defendant's being tried 
together (Hearing Tr. Page 4, Line 12-15). If Defendant 
Carter was not joining in said motion and endeavoring to 
proceed to trial without Defendant Ellis, the State surely 
would have objected. There was no such objection. 
Plaintiff/Appellee contends that Defendant Carter and 
Defendant Ellis appeared to have incompatible interests 
because Ellis was represented by a court-appointed 'attorney 
from the Legal Defender's Association and Defendant Carter 
was represented by court-appointed conflict counsel. This 
is pure speculation and not supported by any record. When a 
case has more than one Defendant charged by the State, the 
Legal Defenders Association has a policy of referring the 
co-defendants to conflict counsel. There were no 
incompatible interest between the co-defendants and the 
record as a whole reflects that their defenses were 
consistent with each other. 
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Based upon Plaintiff/Appellee's mistaken assumption that 
the interests of the co-defendants varied, 
Plaintiff/Appellee argues that it was neither logical nor 
ethically proper for the Defendant to rely upon a co-
defendant' s pretrial motions. It is well established law 
that when two defendants are charged with the same crime, 
they can be tried together. In fact, in this case, the 
Judge ruled that Defendant Carter and Defendant Ellis were 
to be tried together. (Hearing at page 12 line 11) Thus, the 
mere fact that the Legal Defender's Association referred 
Defendant Carter to conflict counsel does not mean that the 
co-defendants interests were adverse. 
II. EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY OF BRIAN MEEK WAS MATERIAL AND 
RELEVANT TO THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT' S CASE. 
Plaintiff/Appellee contends that the Defendant/Appellant 
has failed to demonstrate that the absent witness' testimony 
was both admissible and material to the Defendant's case. 
The issue ar trial was whether or not Mr. Irvin had given 
money to the Defendant/Appellant to buy drugs or whether the 
money was stolen. Defendant/Appellant motioned the court for 
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a continuance based upon the newly discovered witness, in 
order to investigate whether or not the witness' testimony 
that Joshua Irvin was a drug user and buyer was credible or 
could lead to other admissible credible testimony. If the 
testimony, that the newly discovered witness could have 
offered, was credible, then it would have been material to 
the Defendant/Appellant's case. It would have been 
introduced as evidence that Mr. Irvin was a drug user and 
that he approached the Defendant/Appellant for the purpose 
of buying drugs. Furthermore, the victim, Joshua Irvin, 
testified that he neither used or bought marijuana. (Trans, 
at 25 line 14-24) If is were established that Mr. Meek's 
testimony were credible and/or lead to other credible 
evidence, Defendant/Appellant would have recalled Mr. Irvin 
and asked him if he used any illegal drugs. If he answered 
"No", Defendant/Appellant would have introduced Mr. Meek's 
testimony under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 613 for 
purposes of impeachment. 
Plaintiff/Appellee also contends that the 
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Defendant/Appellant failed to investigate 
Defendant/Appellant's account of the events and/or failed to 
investigate any potential witness who might corroborate 
Defendant's story. Again, Plaintiff/Appellee is engaging in 
rank speculation. Defendant/Appellant did not fail to 
investigate if Mr. Irvin was a drug user or whether he had 
purchased drugs prior to this incident. Defendant/Appellant 
was not able to obtain any information of Mr. Irvin's drug 
use prior to the trial. It was only by pure chance that Mr. 
Meek's testimony was discovered. Mr. Irvin had no criminal 
record of drug use and after diligent investigation no 
evidence of drug use was found prior to the trial. 
In addition, Plaintiff/Appellee indicates that Mr. 
Meek's testimony would be hearsay as to the victim, Joshua 
Irvin, owing his friend money for drugs. Had a continuance 
been granted, Defendant/Appellant could have investigated 
and possibly procured the testimony of the friend to whom 
Mr. Irvin allegedly owed money for drugs. 
III. DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS NOT ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT 
THERE WAS A WITNESS THAT COULD POSSIBLY CORROBORATE 
6 
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S VERSION OF EVENTS. 
Defendant/Appellant was not aware of the witness, Brian 
Meek, until court reconvened on the last day of trial. As 
soon as counsel knew that Mr. Meek existed, due diligence 
was used in ascertaining if he in fact knew Joshua Irvin and 
had knowledge of Mr. Irvin's drug use. However, since the 
court denied the Motion For Continuance the matter could not 
be pursued to determine if Mr. Meek would be a credible 
witness and would help the Defendant/Appellant's case. 
Plaintiff/Appellee contends that the Defendant/Appellant 
could have requested permission to reopen the defense case 
and could have recalled Joshua Irvin to the stand and asked 
if he attended Cyprus High School to establish a nexus 
between Meek and Irvin. Plaintiff/Appellee states that in 
the alternative, counsel could have requested a short recess 
in order to call Mr. Meek to the stand to identify Joshua 
Irvin. 
To call Mr. Irvin to the stand to testify that he 
attended Cyprus High School would have accomplished nothing. 
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Mr. Meek's testimony would have only been relevant and 
material if it were used as evidence of Mr. Irvin's prior 
drug use and to impeach Mr. Irvin's prior testimony. 
Furthermore, had counsel put Mr. Meek on the stand, absent 
an investigation of Mr. Meek and the credibility of his 
testimony, it would have been a classic case of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Because Defendant/Appellant was not 
aware of Mr. Meek's existence until the last day of trial, 
Defendant/Appellant did not have a chance to investigate 
whether Mr. Meek's testimony would help or hinder the 
Defendant's case. There was no opportunity to investigate 
Mr. Meek's credibility since the Motion for Continuance was 
denied. Defendant was not afforded the opportunity to 
pursue any investigation in this matter. 
IV. DEFENDANT/APPELLANT DID USE DUE DILIGENCE IN 
INVESTIGATING DEFENDANT'S ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS. 
Defendant/Appellant did not have time to establish and 
investigate if Brian Meek's testimony would corroborate the 
Defendant/Appellant's testimony because the trial was almost 
over and the Court ruled against a Motion for Continuance. 
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In Salazar vs. State, 559 P.2d 66, (Alaska 1976), the court 
ruled that denial of a one-day continuance to secure 
testimony of absent police officer was denial of defendant's 
constitutional rights to call favorable witnesses. The 
court found that the importance of the absent witnesses' 
testimony was central to the defendant's case that denial of 
the right to present this witness was a denial of his Sixth 
Amendment Right. In the Salazar case, the prosecution 
presented evidence that the defendant's car could not be 
seen from the road and the only way the defendant knew the 
car was there was because he had committed the murder. 
However, the absent witness would have testified that the 
car could be seen from the road and would be key testimony 
in the defendant's trial. In the Defendant/Appellant's 
case, the Plaintiff/Appellee presented evidence that the 
victim, Joshua Irvin was not a drug user and did not 
purchase drugs. However, Defendant/Appellant's newly 
discovered witnesses may have testified otherwise and given 
credibility to the Defendant/Appellant's version of the 
9 
events that occurred. Therefore, the court abused its 
discretion in not granting a continuance in order to 
investigate the testimony of Mr. Meeks. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the fore-going, the Defendant/Appellant 
respectfully requests that the Court find that his rights 
were violated and the Motion for Continuance should have 
been granted. 
DATED this £h day of January, 1998. 
Wayne A. Freestone 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
i£ 
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